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Abstract
To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of
policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information.
Often, the information has yet to be produced. This raises two problems. First, for a policy
maker it is hard to ascertain how much effort an expert has put in acquiring information.
Second, when the expert has an interest in the policy outcome, she may manipulate
information to bring the policy decision more in line with her preferences. We show that
experts who are unbiased toward the policy alternatives put highest effort in collecting
information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences
of the policy maker and the expert are aligned. Hence, when selecting an expert, policy
makers face a trade-off. We show that policy makers optimally appoint experts with policy
preferences which are less extreme than their own.
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Policy makers have to make many decisions of which the consequences are compli-
cated and diﬃcult to foresee. Because of a lack of time and abilities, it is virtually
impossible for members of parliament, ministers, or a president to become well in-
formed about the consequences of all their decisions.
Division of labor may help to solve this problem. This is reﬂe c t e di nt h eo r -
ganization of the political decision making process. An essential feature of the
organization of the government is specialization. Political executives are organized
into ministries. Legislature are organized into jurisdictions. A well-known reason
for specialization is that it facilitates information collection.
Specialization, however, also creates serious agency problems. First, specializa-
tion may lead to a situation where informed agents have disproportionate inﬂuence
in a policy area. Information about the consequences of policies is usually hard to
verify by policy makers. The unveriﬁablity of information leaves room for informed
agents to manipulate information or to frame their recommendations. Thus, in-
formed agents often acquire eﬀective control over decisions, even if they do not have
formal authority for selecting actions (Aghion and Tirole, 1997).
Second, it is often hard for policy makers to ascertain the eﬀort the agents have
put in producing information. Devoting more resources to producing information is
supposed to lead to a recommendation which is based on better information. The
quality of information is, however, hard to observe. Better information does not
always lead to thicker reports (large models are not always better than small ones).
This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers
in the light of these agency problems. We analyze who, in a group of heterogeneous
agents, are appointed to collect information and to give policy recommendations.
We examine a model in which a decision maker (parliament, a president, a min-
ister) has to choose between two alternatives: implementation and status quo. The
consequences of the project are surrounded by uncertainty. Without further infor-
mation, the decision maker runs the risk of making a wrong decision. He can appoint
an agent to collect information about the consequences of the project and to make
a recommendation. We refer to this agent as the expert. One could think of this
expert as an homogeneous legislative committee or a public agency. The expert
2promotes what she perceives as the public interest. Her perception of the public
interest may deviate from that of the decision maker. After the expert has made
a recommendation about the project, the decision maker decides whether or not to
implement the project.
The focus of the analysis is on the collection of information and the transmis-
sion of information. Our model treats information as a good with the following
characteristics. First, the production of information involves costly eﬀort. Second,
the production of information is uncertain. In spite of her eﬀort, the expert may
make mistakes. The probability of making mistakes decreases in the expert’s eﬀort.
Third, the expert’s eﬀort - and thus the quality of information - is not observed by
the policy maker. Fourth, the information obtained by the expert can not be veriﬁed
by the policy maker. Hence, when making a decision, the policy maker must rely
on the expert’s recommendation (or possibly manipulated information).
The weak link between information and the recommendation implies that it is
hard for the decision maker to ascertain the eﬀort the expert has put in producing
information. The non-veriﬁability of information leaves room for an expert to frame
her recommendation. The ﬁrst problem leads to uncertainty about the quality of
information on which a recommendation is based. The second problem leads to un-
certainty about the quality of the recommendation, given the quality of information.
We derive three main results. First, we show that the eﬀo r ta ne x p e r tp u t si n
collecting information depends on her perception of the public interest. An expert
who has a strong prior either against or in favor of the project exerts less eﬀort
than an expert who is unbiased. The intuition is that strong priors reduce the
probability that information aﬀects advice. The instrumental value of information
is therefore small for experts with strong priors. An implication of this result is that
by appointing an expert who is unbiased toward one of the policy alternatives, the
decision maker maximizes the eﬀort put in producing information.
Our second result is that, given the information produced by the expert, the
quality of the recommendation depends negatively on the diﬀerence between the
decision maker’s and the expert’s perception of the public interest. This result is in
line with the existing literature on communication (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). By
appointing an expert whose perception of the public interest coincides with his own
perception, the decision maker maximizes the quality of the recommendation, given
3the quality of the information produced by the expert.
Together the above results imply that, when the decision maker can select an
expert on the basis of her perception of the public interest, then he faces a tradeoﬀ
between the quality of the recommendation and the quality of the information the
recommendation is based on. We show that it is in the interest of the decision maker
to appoint an expert whose perception of the public interest deviates from his own
perception, except for the special case where the decision maker is neither biased
toward implementation of the project nor biased toward status quo. If the decision
maker is at least somewhat biased, he will appoint an expert who is less biased so
as to increase the quality of information.
Our study is related to the the literature on the role of information providers
in the policy-decision process. Games of incomplete information are used to study
communication between an uninformed policy maker and an informed agent (see,
for example, Austen-Smith, 1990 and 1993). As the present paper, this literature is
based on the assumption that the informed agent has a vested interest in the policy
outcome (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986). Models of communication are applied to
interest groups (Potters and Van Winden, 1992), to bureaucrats (for a survey, see
Lupia and McCubbins, 1998), voters (Lohmann, 1993), and committee members
(Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987 and 1989). The focus of this literature is on informa-
tion transmission. A well-known result is that, if there are no costs of supplying
information, information transmission requires that the interests of the policy maker
and the information provider are not too far apart (Crawford and Sobel, 1982).1 Kr-
ishna and Morgan (2001) illustrate this point for the case in which a decision maker
consults two experts. Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001)e x a m i n eam o d e lo fe x p e r t i s e
in which experts care about their reputation. They show that reputational concerns
may lead to herding problems.
Our theoretical contribution is that we relax the assumption of a speciﬁcd i s t r i -
bution of information among agents. Although this assumption is natural in situ-
ations where agents possess information as a by-product of their normal activities,
it is less natural in situations where decision makers need information which does
not exist yet. Endogenizing information collection has important and potentially
1If supplying information is costly, information transmission depends less on the congruence of
preferences [for a survey of the signaling literature see Banks (1991)].
4testable consequences. Krehbiel (1992) argues that legislative committees will not
be composed of preference outliers. In his study on legislative organization, outlier
means that the preferences of the expert deviate from the preferences of the median
member of the group. In our analysis, experts are outliers in the sense of Krehbiel,
if the median member of the group is at least somewhat biased towards one of the
policy alternatives.
The result that policy makers appoint outliers so as to increase the quality of
information becomes even stronger when information is veriﬁable. The reason is that
the quality of recommendation does no longer depend on the adviser’s perception of
the public interest when information is hard. We show that if the policy maker is
biased in favour of implementing the project and information is hard, he appoints an
adviser who has strong priors against implementation, and vice versa. The intuition
is straightforward. The stronger an adviser is biased in opposite direction, the more
she wants to prevent the policy maker from choosing the policy alternative in line
with his priors. The only way to accomplish this is to come up with a piece of
evidence which convinces the policy maker that he should not follow his prior belief.
The probability to ﬁnd such a piece of evidence increases in the adviser’s eﬀort.
We also study the case where advisers always learn some information of which the
content is veriﬁable but the quality is not. In that case, the adviser’s opportunity
to conceal information has the same implications as the opportunity to manipulate
information in the case of unveriﬁable information.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the interaction between the decision maker and an expert being responsible
for acquiring information. In Section 4, the decision maker selects an expert on the
basis of her preferences. Section 5 examines cases of veriﬁable information. Section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a situation where citizens delegate the decision about a public project,
X, to a policy maker. As to this project, there are two alternatives: implementation
(denoted by X =1 ) and status quo (denoted by X =0 ). We assume that the
policy maker tries to make a decision which accords with his perception of the
5public interest. If the policy maker chooses implementation his payoﬀ increases
with p + µ,w h e r ep denotes the expected social beneﬁt of the project as perceived
by the policy maker, and µ is a stochastic term, which is distributed by f (µ).T h e
expected value of µ is zero. The cumulative distribution of µ is denoted by F (µ).
Our interpretation of µ is that the consequences of the project are surrounded by
uncertainty. If the policy maker chooses X =0 ,h i sp a y o ﬀ does not change.
Under full information, the policy maker would choose X =1if µ>−p,a n d
X =0if µ ≤− p.2 However, the policy maker does not observe µ. The implication
is that without information about µ the policy maker would choose X =1if p>0,
and X =0if p ≤ 0.I ti s e v i d e n t t h a t ,i f0 <F(−p) < 1, then the policy maker
runs the risk of making a wrong decision about the project.
The policy maker lacks time or abilities to examine µ.3 To gain information
about µ, the policy maker can hire an adviser.4 An adviser receives a signal γ,
which may contain information about µ. The quality of the adviser’s signal depends
on her eﬀort e ≥ 0, which cannot be observed by the policy maker. With probability
π(e), the signal is fully informative, implying γ = µ,w h e r eπ (e) is increasing and
concave and π (0) = 0. With probability 1−π(e), the signal is uninformative. Then,
γ is drawn from f (γ). Except when e =0 , neither the adviser nor the policy maker
knows whether or not the signal is informative.5 The adviser is eﬀort averse. Her
cost of supplying eﬀort is c(e). The function c(e) is increasing and convex, with
c(0) = 0.
After receiving the signal, the adviser makes a recommendation. She can either
recommend X =1or recommend X =0 . Communication between the policy maker
and the adviser is limited to the recommendation made by the adviser. Information
is thus soft: it cannot be instantaneously veriﬁed by the policy maker. In Section
5 we examine the case where information is hard. Restricting the message space
to two messages is without loss of generality, because the model revolves around a
2Without loss of generality, we assume that if the policy maker is indiﬀerent between imple-
mentation and status quo, he chooses status quo.
3We thus assume that producing information requires expertise the policy maker does not
possess. For less complicated decisions, the policy maker can choose to specialize (Gilligan and
Krehbiel, 1989)
4We assume that the policy maker cannot hire more than one adviser.
5The assumption that π(e) > 0 for e>0 is made for convenience. The assumption ensures
an interior solution of eﬀort. The free-rider problem concerning the production of information
becomes more profound if π(e)=0for e<e>0.
6binary decision. Consequently, irrespective of her type, the adviser either prefers
implementation or status quo. Thus, with two possible messages, what needs to be
said can be said. If we had assumed a richer message space, we would also have
found a binary equilibrium.
Like the policy maker, an adviser is concerned with the public interest. However,
because of diﬀerences in normative values or ideology, the adviser’s perception may
diﬀer from that of the policy maker. If the policy maker hires an adviser and
chooses X =1 , then the payoﬀ to the adviser is a + µ − c(e),w h e r ea denotes the
expected social beneﬁt of the project as perceived by the adviser. If the status quo
is maintained, then the payoﬀ to the adviser is −c(e). The diﬀerence between a and
p reﬂects the diﬀerence between the policy maker’s and the adviser’s perception of
the public interest.
Since information is soft in our model, the recommendation made by the adviser
is ”cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). It is well-known that in cheap-talk
games several equilibria may exist. We focus on an equilibrium in which informa-
tion transmission between the players is possible. Moreover, we assume a ”natural”
language, in the sense that the adviser’s recommendation always reﬂects her pre-
ferred action
3 Adviser’s Eﬀort and Policy Recommendation
Suppose that the policy maker always follows the adviser’s recommendation. It is
then optimal for the adviser to recommend X =1if X =1yields a higher expected
payoﬀ, conditional on γ,t h a nX =0 . The adviser thus recommends X =1if





Equation (1) gives the evaluation criterion used by the adviser. If the policy maker
had received a signal about µ, he would have chosen X =1if γ > −
p
π(e),a n dX =0
otherwise. Hence, only when a = p, there is perfect communication between the
policy maker and the adviser. If a>p , there is a risk that the adviser recommends
implementation while status quo would be optimal for the policy maker, and vice
7versa.



































The ﬁrst two terms of (2) give the expected beneﬁts of eﬀort. The last term gives






µf (µ)dµ = c
0 (e) (3)
Equation (3) implicitly deﬁnes the adviser’s optimal level of eﬀort, e∗, as a function
of a, e∗ = e∗ (a). The implicit function theorem applied to (3) shows that e∗
a (0) = 0,
e∗
a < 0 for a>0,a n de∗
a > 0 for a<0.T h e s eﬁndings imply that an adviser who is
”unbiased” (a =0 )e x e r t sm o s te ﬀort. The more the adviser is biased toward one of
the policy choices, the less eﬀort she will make. The intuition is straightforward. The
probability that, without information about µ, the adviser makes a costly mistake
decreases with the absolute value of a. The reason is that the probability that
information about µ c h a n g e st h ea d v i s e r ’ sp r e f e r e n c e so v e rp o l i c i e si ss m a l lw h e ns h e
is strongly biased. As a consequence, the expected beneﬁts of information decrease
with |a|.
So far, we have assumed that the policy maker follows the adviser’s recommen-
dation. Let us now identify the conditions under which it is optimal for the policy
maker to follow this strategy. Given the adviser’s strategy, it is optimal for the
policy maker to choose X =1when the adviser recommends X =1 , if implemen-
tation yields a higher expected payoﬀ than status quo. It is easy to verify that this
6Throughout, we assume that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisﬁed. This













Analogously, we can show that it is optimal for the policy maker to choose status











Clearly, if a = p, then it is always optimal for the policy maker to follow the adviser’s
recommendation. Given eﬀort, the more a deviates from p, the lower is the payoﬀ to
the policy maker. Conditions (4) and (5) therefore imply that it is only optimal for
the policy maker to follow the adviser’s recommendation if a does not deviate too
much from p. Clearly, the conditions become less restrictive, the higher the value of
π(e∗) and the lower |p|.
4 The Optimal Adviser from the Policy Maker’s
Point of View
In the previous section we have shown that the adviser’s perception of the public
interest determines her eﬀort level. Thus, a aﬀects the quality of information on
which policy decisions are based. In addition, we have shown that a aﬀects the
quality of the recommendation. If a deviates from p, then the recommendation
made by the adviser may be inconsistent with the policy maker’s preferences. In
this section we derive the optimal value of a from the policy maker’s perspective.
The idea is that the policy maker can create a public agency with monopoly power
and can shape its preferences by appointing a head with the appropriate perception
of the public interest.
What value of a is optimal for the policy maker? To answer this question, we
































2 < 0 (8)
Equation (7) implicitly deﬁnes the optimal value of a, a∗, as a function of p.
Proposition 1 If p =0 ,t h e na∗ =0 .I fp>0,t h e n0 <a ∗ <p .I fp<0,t h e n
p<a ∗ < 0.
Proof. Using (3), it is easy to see that if p =0 , then condition (7) is satisﬁed
iﬀ a∗ =0 . The proof for the other two cases is by contradiction. Suppose p>0.I f
a∗ ≥ p, then the LHS of (7) is greater than or equal to zero, while the RHS is smaller
than zero. Hence, a∗ <p .I fa∗ ≤ 0,t h e nt h eR H So f( 7 )i sg r e a t e rt h a no re q u a l
to zero, while the LHS is smaller than zero. Hence, a∗ ≥ 0.W h e n a = p,a l w a y s
following advice yields a higher expected payoﬀ than always ignoring advice. Since
a = a∗ yields a higher expected payoﬀ than a = p, it is optimal for the policy maker
to follow advice (restriction 5 is satisﬁed). Hiring an adviser whose recommendation
might not be followed reduces the adviser’s incentive to search for information while
the adviser’s incentive to manipulate information remains the same. The proof for
t h ec a s et h a tp<0 is analogous.
Proposition 1 says that a policy maker who is biased toward implementation
(status quo) consults an expert who is less biased toward implementation (status
quo) than himself. Against the background of our earlier result that the eﬀort level
depends negatively on |a|, the above proposition is hardly surprising. Recall that
the policy maker consults an adviser in order to avoid a policy failure. In the present
10model, imperfect communication and a wrong signal received by an adviser are the
possible reasons for a policy failure. By appointing an adviser whose perception
of the public interest coincides with that of himself, the policy maker prevents a
policy failure owing to imperfect communication. By appointing an adviser with
a =0 , the policy maker minimizes the probability that the adviser receives an
incorrect signal about µ. The proposition shows that when the policy maker selects
an adviser, he faces a trade-oﬀ between the quality of information and the quality
of recommendations.
Our insight is related to Gilligan and Krehbiel’s (1987, 1989) analysis of the
congressional committee system. They argue that only committee members with
moderate preferences have an incentive to specialize, i.e. to produce information.
In their work, however, moderate preferences mean preferences closely aligned to
the preferences of the median member in Congress. Their argument refers to the
credibility of advice, i.e. the quality of the recommendations, given the quality
of information. Our analysis shows that there is also another story. Moderate
preferences, in the sense of no strong bias toward implementation or status quo,
induces a adviser to look harder for information.
5V e r i ﬁable Information
In this section, we examine the implications of changing our assumptions about the
nature of information. First, we examine a situation in which the policy maker
can freely verify information, but the adviser can choose to conceal information, as
in Milgrom and Roberts (1986). Next, we analyze the case where information is
veriﬁable and the adviser’s eﬀort determines the probability with which a signal is
observed instead of the quality of the signal, as in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
We show that our results of the previous sections are robust to the ﬁrst modiﬁcation
but not to the second one.
5.1 Opportunity to Conceal Information
The introduction of freely veriﬁable information which can be concealed extends the
message space. Apart from recommending X =0and recommending X =1 ,t h e
adviser can conceal information, i.e. be silent.
11To analyze the implications of veriﬁable information, let us ﬁrst determine when
the adviser wants to conceal information. First consider the case that a<p . Then,
an adviser wants to conceal information if (1) γ ∈ [−
p
π(e),− a
π(e)) and (2) concealing
information induces the policy maker to choose X =0 .D o e si tm a k es e n s ef o ra n
adviser to conceal information if γ ∈ [−
p
π(e),− a
π(e))? The answer to this question is
in the aﬃrmative, provided that the adviser never recommends X =0 .T os e ew h y ,
ﬁrst note that, if γ > − a
π(e), then it is in the interest of the adviser to recommend
X =1 . The policy maker, who can verify information, will respond by choosing
X =1 . Now suppose that the adviser recommends X =0if γ ≤−
p
π(e). Again, the
policy maker will follow his adviser when he learns that γ ≤−
p
π(e). However, from




π(e)). Concealment of information thus induces the policy maker to
choose X =1 . It is easy to verify that if the adviser’s strategy is ”be silent” when
γ ≤− a
π(e), and recommend X =1when γ > − a
π(e), then it is optimal for the policy
maker to choose X =1when the adviser recommends X =1and to choose X =0
when the adviser is silent. But this set of stategies is equivalent to the equilibrium
set of strategies discussed in Section 3, except that now the adviser is silent rather
than recommends X =0when γ ≤− a
π(e).
In a similar way, we can show that in case a>pan equilibrium exists in which
(1) the adviser is silent when γ > − a
π(e), and recommends X =0when γ ≤− a
π(e)
and (2) the policy maker chooses X =0when the adviser recommends X =0 ,
and chooses X =1otherwise. Hence, we can conclude that the introduction of
veriﬁable messages together with the opportunity of concealment of information by
the adviser only aﬀects the nature of the adviser’s messages. It neither aﬀects eﬀort,
nor the policy maker’s choice of his adviser.7
5.2 Eﬀort-dependent Learning of Information
In this subsection, we modify the information production process to deepen our un-
derstanding of the driving forces behind our argument. Instead of assuming that
7Results change when advisers can not conceal veriﬁable information. Then, on a range of a
in the neighbourhood of p, advisers have the same incentive to exert eﬀort, while advisers outside
this range are not willing to participate. Clearly, advisers’ policy preferences only aﬀect their
eﬀort if they have an opportunity to put a stamp on policy decisions, either by manipulation or
by concealment of information.
12the adviser always observes a signal of which the quality depends on his eﬀort, we
follow Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) in assuming that the adviser’s eﬀort deter-
mines the probability with which a fully informative signal is observed. In case of
unveriﬁable messages, this modiﬁcation is innocuous. When the adviser’s signal can
be veriﬁed, results change dramatically. Without aﬀecting the results, we assume
that information can not be concealed.
The adviser has to expend eﬀort to observe µ. We assume that with probability
π(e), the adviser learns µ. Since information can neither be concealed nor manipu-
lated, if the adviser learns µ, then the policy maker learns µ as well. With probability
1 − π(e), the adviser learns nothing. We address two questions. First, how does
eﬀort depend on a with hard information? Second, what are the consequences of
hard information for the optimal type of adviser?
To answer these questions, let us ﬁrst consider the strategy of the policy maker.
If the adviser does not learn µ, the policy maker has to make a decision about X
without information about µ. Consequently, he will choose X =1if p>0 and
X =0if p ≤ 0.I f t h e a d v i s e r l e a r n s µ, then the policy maker learns µ as well.
Consequently, the policy maker chooses X =1if µ>−p and X =0otherwise.
Let us now turn to the adviser. When information is hard, the adviser does not
make a recommendation. She only determines how much eﬀort to put in informa-
tion collection. Suppose p<0. The adviser anticipates that the project will be
implemented if and only if she ﬁnds evidence that µ>−p. Her expected payoﬀ
when selecting eﬀort is:







1 − F (−p)


 − c(e) (9)
It is easy to verify that the ﬁrst-order condition for a maximum of (9) deﬁnes e as
a function of a and p. Application of the implicit function theorem shows that e
increases with both a and p. The intuition is clear. The policy maker chooses X =0
if he does not receive further information about µ,a sp<0. The stronger an adviser
is biased towards implementation, the more the adviser wants to prevent the policy
maker from choosing X =0 . The only way to convince the policymaker to choose
X =1is to show that µ>−p. The probability that the adviser ﬁnds such a piece
13of evidence increases in her eﬀort. The reason that eﬀort is increasing in p is that
the higher is p (given that p<0), the higher is the probability that the adviser ﬁnds
that µ>−p.
Now suppose p>0. Then, without information about µ, the decision maker








1 − F (−p)


 +[ 1− π(e)]a − c(e) (10)
We can show that e is decreasing in a and p. Hence, the more an adviser is biased
against the project, the more eﬀort she puts in information collection.
The above results have obvious consequences for the policy maker’s choice of
adviser. With veriﬁable information, the credibility of the message is not important.
Only eﬀort matters. The policy maker should therefore appoint an adviser who has
an opposite perception of the public interest.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has studied the delegation of information collection by policy makers to
policy-motivated experts. The analysis has centered on two agency problems: the
uncertainty about the eﬀort experts put in producing information and the risk that
experts manipulate information or frame their recommendation. We have shown
that the more an expert is biased toward one of the policy alternatives, the weaker
her incentive to produce information. Hence, to maximize the quality of information,
the policy maker should rely on unbiased experts. However, if the policy maker is
biased toward one of the policy alternatives, unbiased experts manipulate informa-
tion. To maximize the quality of the recommendation, the preferences of the policy
maker and the expert should coincide. In selecting an expert, the policy maker thus
faces a tradeoﬀ between the quality of the recommendation and the quality of the
information the recommendation is based on. We have shown that policy makers
optimally appoint experts who are biased in the same direction as the policy maker
but less extremely than the policy maker.
An important assumption underlying our analysis is that information about the
14eﬀects of policies is not easily veriﬁed by policy makers because of a lack of time or
expertise on the part of policy makers. Although we believe that this is a typical
feature of the policy making process, policy makers may occasionally be experts
themselves or have acquired expertise over time, and hence may be less vulnerable
to manipulation of information. This may change the optimal selection of policy
motivated experts depending on the characteristics of the information production
process. In the case where an adviser always learns information of which the quality
depends on her eﬀort, results are unaﬀected as long as the adviser has the op-
portunity to conceal information. However, when the discovery of information is
dependent on eﬀort, policy makers optimally appoint experts who are strongly bi-
ased in the direction opposite to the policy maker’s bias. The intuition is that these
experts have the strongest incentive to convince the policy maker not to choose the
policy alternative in line with the policy maker’s priors. The expert’s eﬀort increases
the probability the she discovers information that can convince the policy maker.
We have made several simplifying assumptions about the political process. Par-
ticularly, we have assumed that the policy decision is delegated to a single individual,
and that this individual is only concerned with outcomes. The implication of these
assumptions is that the only reason why a policy maker consults advisers is to avoid
policy failures. In reality, often several policy makers are involved in making policy
decisions. The implication is that a policy maker may want to consult an adviser to
persuade other policy makers to support his policy proposals (Swank, Letterie and
Van Dalen, 1999). Introducing elections into the model may also aﬀect our results.
Elections may induce policy makers to consult advisers to justify policies, rather
than to obtain information. Moreover, distortions in the election process may imply
that the optimal adviser from the policy maker’s point of view is diﬀerent from the
optimal adviser from the electorate’s point of view.
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